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The Dark Side of Testing Memory: Repeated Retrieval Can Enhance
Eyewitness Suggestibility
Abstract
Eyewitnesses typically recount their experiences many times before trial. Such repeated retrieval can enhance
memory retention of the witnessed event. However, recent studies (e.g., Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009)
have found that initial retrieval can exacerbate eyewitness suggestibility to later misleading information—a
finding termed retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES). Here we examined the influence of multiple retrieval
attempts on eyewitness suggestibility to subsequent misinformation. In four experiments, we systematically
varied the number of initial tests taken (between zero and six), the delay between initial testing and
misinformation exposure (~30 min or 1 week), and whether initial testing was manipulated between- or
within-subjects. University undergraduate students were used as participants. Overall, we found that
eyewitness suggestibility increased as the number of initial tests increased, but this RES effect was qualified by
the delay and by whether initial testing occurred in a within- or between-subjects manner. Specifically, the
within-subjects RES effect was smaller than the between-subjects RES effect, possibly because of the influence
of retrieval-induced forgetting/facilitation (Chan, 2009) when initial testing was manipulated within subjects.
Moreover, consistent with the testing effect literature (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), the benefits of repeated
testing on later memory were stronger after a 1-week delay than after a 30-min delay, thus reducing the
negative impact of RES in long-term situations. These findings suggest that conditions that are likely to occur
in criminal investigations can either increase (repeated testing) or reduce (delay) the influence of RES, thus
further demonstrating the complex relationship between eyewitness memory and repeated retrieval.
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Abstract 
Eyewitnesses typically recount their experiences many times before trial.  Such repeated retrieval 
can enhance memory retention of the witnessed event.  However, recent studies (e.g., Chan, 
Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009) have found that initial retrieval can exacerbate eyewitness 
suggestibility to later misleading information – a finding termed retrieval-enhanced suggestibility 
(RES).  Here we examined the influence of multiple retrieval attempts on eyewitness 
suggestibility to subsequent misinformation.  In four experiments, we systematically varied the 
number of initial tests taken (between zero and six), the delay between initial testing and 
misinformation exposure (~30 min or 1 week), and whether initial testing was manipulated 
between- or within-subjects.  University undergraduate students were used as participants.  
Overall, we found that eyewitness suggestibility increased as the number of initial tests 
increased, but this RES effect was qualified by the delay and by whether initial testing occurred 
in a within- or between-subjects manner.  Specifically, the within-subjects RES effect was 
smaller than the between-subjects RES effect, possibly due to the influence of retrieval-induced 
forgetting/facilitation (Chan, 2009) when initial testing was manipulated within-subjects.  
Moreover, consistent with the testing effect literature (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), the benefits 
of repeated testing on later memory were stronger following a 1-week delay than following a 30 
min delay, thus reducing the negative impact of RES in long-term situations.  These findings 
suggest that conditions that are likely to occur in criminal investigations can either increase 
(repeated testing) or reduce (delay) the influence of RES, thus further demonstrating the complex 
relationship between eyewitness memory and repeated retrieval. 
(Word Count: 249)
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The Dark Side of Testing Memory: Repeated Retrieval Can Enhance Eyewitness Suggestibility 
The legal process is long and arduous.  After witnessing a crime, it is not unusual for 
weeks or months to pass before one provides testimony in court.  For example, a six-month delay 
separated the murders and the beginning of the criminal trial in the highly publicized O.J. 
Simpson case.  During the delay between witnessing a crime and providing testimony, witnesses 
are often questioned by police investigators, lawyers, friends, and family members (Gray, 1993; 
Whitcomb, Shapiro, & Stellwagen, 1985).  Moreover, during this delay, eyewitnesses can 
encounter misleading information from various sources (Allen & Lindsay, 1998; Lindsay, Allen, 
Chan, & Dahl, 2004).  It is well known that misinformation can degrade the later accuracy of 
eyewitness reports (for a recent review, see Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007).  In the present 
study, we sought to examine the effects of repeated retrieval on the ability for people to resist 
subsequently presented misleading information. 
The Effects of Repeated Retrieval on Retention 
Research on the suggestibility of human memory has had a long tradition, beginning with 
the pioneering though underappreciated work of Binet (1900).  In recent years, a controversy has 
emerged in the literature on children’s memory.  While some researchers assert that recall 
accuracy can decline over repeated retrieval attempts, especially if the interviews are conducted 
in a suggestive manner, others suggest the opposite, especially when open-ended, nonleading 
questions (as opposed to yes/no questions) are asked (for reviews on the topic, see Goodman & 
Quas, 2008; Hershkowitz & Terner, 2007; La Rooy, Katz, Malloy, & Lamb, 2010; La Rooy, 
Lamb, & Pipe, 2009; Memon & Vartoukian, 1996).     
The findings in the adult memory literature are similarly mixed.  While some studies 
showed that repeated retrieval can increase errors in memory reports (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; 
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Henkel, 2004; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Roediger, Jacoby, & McDermott, 1996; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995), others have shown the reverse (e.g., Ballard, 1913; Bluck, Levine, & 
Laulhere, 1999; Bornstein, Liebel, & Scarberry, 1998; Brown, 1923; Erdelyi & Becker, 1974; 
Scrivner & Safer, 1988).  How can one reconcile these disparate findings?  Wheeler and 
Roediger (1992) proposed that one deciding factor is the delay between successive recall 
attempts.  Specifically, if the delay between recall trials is short, accurate recall probability is 
likely to rise between recall attempts, but if the delay between recall attempts is long, forgetting 
can set in and errors tend to increase across recall trials (see also Odinot, Wolters, & Lavender, 
2009; Turtle & Yuille, 1994).   
In addition to the delay between recall attempts, the nature of the study material can also 
contribute to whether repeated retrieval would benefit or harm later recall.  When the study 
materials are designed to elicit false recall, repeated retrieval can impair memory accuracy.  For 
example, repeated retrieval increases false recall of a nonpresented word (e.g., sleep) after 
subjects have studied its related words (e.g., bed, rest, awake, etc., McDermott, 2006; Payne, 
Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996).  Similarly, repeatedly imagining an action (e.g., picking up 
a pencil) increases the likelihood that one would mistakenly remember having performed that 
action (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003).  
Moreover, repeated retrieval increases source monitoring errors for visually confusable materials 
(such as a lollipop and a magnifying glass, Henkel, 2004).  Most relevant to current purposes is 
the finding that repeated testing can increase the recall of misleading information (Register & 
Kihlstrom, 1988; Roediger et al., 1996).  Similar results have been shown when subjects are 
repeatedly interviewed in a misleading, suggestive manner (e.g., Melnyk & Bruck, 2004).  
Clearly, for materials that are designed to evoke erroneous memories, repeated retrieval can have 
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harmful effects. 
Unlike materials designed to elicit errors, repeated retrieval of neutral materials typically 
produces hypermnesia.  Hypermnesia refers to a net increase in accurate recall over multiple 
retrieval attempts (for a review, see Payne, 1987).  Due to its legal relevance, researchers have 
examined the effects of repeated retrieval in the realm of eyewitness memory.  Here, too, 
hypermnesia is regularly found, and it occurs for a variety of materials, including videos (Otani 
et al., 2008; Scrivner & Safer, 1988), violent events (Bornstein et al., 1998), and 
autobiographical events (Bluck et al., 1999; see also Hershkowitz & Terner, 2007, where 
reminiscence, but not hypermnesia, is found for children).  In addition to producing 
hypermnesia, repeated retrieval can slow forgetting of the studied material (Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006).  The impressive benefits of retrieval on long-term retention have been found 
across a wide variety of materials (Carpenter, Pashler, Wixted, & Vul, 2008; Chan, 2010; 
Wheeler, Ewers, & Buonanno, 2003).   
In sum, repeated retrieval can benefit memory performance in the short-term (i.e., 
hypermnesia across recall trials) and in the long-term (i.e., a slowing of forgetting) when it 
occurs in a nonleading, neutral environment.  However, when repeated retrieval occurs following 
the introduction of misleading information, or when the repeated questioning happens in a 
suggestive manner, it can increase errors in memory report.  In the current study, the repeated 
recall attempts occurred before misinformation was presented. 
The Effects of (Single) Prior Retrieval on Eyewitness Suggestibility 
If repeated retrieval can enhance memory performance, can it be implemented to protect 
eyewitnesses from the debilitating effects of misleading postevent information?  Several studies 
have examined whether testing a witness’ memory prior to misinformation exposure can reduce 
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eyewitness suggestibility, and the results so far are mixed.  In one of the first attempts to 
examine the effects of prior recall on subsequent eyewitness suggestibility, Geiselman and 
colleagues (1986) investigated whether the cognitive interview can reduce eyewitness 
susceptibility to misinformation.  It can, at least in comparison to a standard recall task.  
However, because the researchers did not include a no-initial-recall control condition, it is not 
possible to determine whether initial recall had actually reduced eyewitness suggestibility 
relative to no initial recall (see also Holliday, 2003; Memon, Holley, Wark, Bull, & Kohnken, 
1996).  Recently, Memon and colleagues (2010) examined whether recalling a witnessed event 
can reduce subsequent eyewitness suggestibility.  In this experiment, participants completed 
either a free recall test or the cognitive interview before or after misinformation exposure in a 
factorial design.  Participants generated their own misinformation during a forced fabrication 
phase and took a yes/no recognition test one week later.  Memon et al. found that false 
recognition was reduced when the cognitive interview was given before, rather than after, 
misinformation fabrication.  Notably, however, initial free recall produced no such benefit.  
Of most relevance to the current study is a series of experiments reported by Chan and 
colleagues (Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan et al., 2009; Thomas, Bulevich, & Chan, 2010).  In 
these experiments, participants first viewed a video event and then either took a cued recall test 
or performed a distractor task.  Afterwards, participants were exposed to misinformation via a 
postevent narrative that purportedly recapped the video, which was followed by a final memory 
test.  Chan et al. reported a surprising finding – initial testing (relative to a distractor task) 
increased, rather than decreased, participants' susceptibility to later misinformation.  In a 
subsequent study, Chan and Langley showed that this retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES) 
effect is long-lasting and can occur regardless of whether misinformation is presented 
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immediately or one week following the initial test.  Thomas et al. further extended this RES 
effect to a multiple choice recognition test and showed that participants are highly confident 
when they report misinformation in the RES procedure.  However, they also reported a boundary 
condition for RES – it is eliminated when participants are given a warning about the accuracy of 
the postevent narrative (see also Lane, Mather, Villa, & Morita, 2001, who reported no RES 
effect with a brief, 5-min free recall initial test and a source monitoring final test).   
To account for this RES effect, Chan et al. (2009) suggested that the initial test questions 
might have inadvertently 'highlighted' some aspects of the witnessed event.  When participants 
encounter new information (or misinformation) regarding these details in the postevent narrative, 
the new information captures participants’ attention and becomes particularly well encoded.  
This enhanced learning of the misinformation is then revealed as RES.  This hypothesis has 
received additional support in subsequent reports (Chan & Langley, 2011; Thomas et al., 2010) 
and can account for the finding reported by Memon et al. (2010).  Specifically, because 
participants generated their own misinformation, the encoding of such misinformation was 
unlikely to be enhanced by the initial recall test.  As a result, no RES effect would be expected 
(see too Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011).  We return to a more thorough exploration of this 
hypothesis and its implications in the General Discussion. 
The Effects of Repeated Retrieval on Eyewitness Suggestibility 
Although several studies have examined the effects of initial recall on subsequent 
eyewitness suggestibility, no research to date has examined the effects of taking repeated initial 
recall tests on later eyewitness suggestibility.  Based on previous research, two predictions can 
be drawn.  First, given that taking an initial recall test can lead to increased susceptibility to 
misinformation, taking multiple initial tests may further exacerbate eyewitness suggestibility.  
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That is, the repeated recall tests may cause the later misinformation to capture participants’ 
attention even more during the postevent narrative (relative to a single test), thus enhancing the 
learning of these misleading details.  Alternatively, taking repeated recall tests may reduce 
subsequent eyewitness suggestibility and eliminate RES.  This prediction can be drawn because 
of two reasons.  First, repeated retrieval is a powerful memory enhancer, and eyewitnesses are 
more likely to resist misinformation when the original memory is stronger (Loftus, 1979; 
Marche, 1999; Peterson, Parsons, & Dean, 2004); therefore, recalling details of an event multiple 
times may lead to a reduction in later suggestibility.  Second, one component of the cognitive 
interview involves repeated retrieval.  Provided that the cognitive interview may be effective at 
reducing subsequent eyewitness suggestibility (Memon et al., 2010), repeated retrieval may show 
similar benefits.  Essentially, this prediction suggests that the relation between repeated testing 
and suggestibility is nonlinear (for a recent demonstration of a quadratic relation between 
repeated questioning and children's witness memory accuracy, see Krahenbuhl, Blades, & Eiser, 
2009).  Note that in addition to repeated retrieval, the cognitive interview uses other techniques 
that are absent from the current study (e.g., rapport building, context reinstatement, free recall 
followed by cued recall, and recall from multiple perspectives and in various temporal orders).  
Therefore, even if repeated retrieval alone cannot suppress the misinformation effect in the 
present study, it remains possible that the cognitive interview can. 
Overall Design and Materials of the Present Experiments 
 To provide a relatively comprehensive investigation of the effects of repeated retrieval on 
eyewitness suggestibility, we examined three variables across four experiments.  The first 
variable was the number of initial tests taken (0, 1, 3, 5, and 6 across the various experiments).  
The second was the delay that separated the initial and final tests (i.e., 30 min or 1 week).  The 
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third was whether the testing manipulation (i.e., nontested vs. tested) occurred between- or 
within-subjects.  This is the first time the RES procedure has been implemented in both a 
between- and within-subjects design.  This manipulation served two purposes.  First, given its 
practical implications, it is important to examine the generality of the RES phenomenon across 
different experimental designs.  Indeed, the between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons 
ask different questions regarding RES.  In a between-subjects comparison, the question is 
whether testing increases eyewitness suggestibility for a particular witness.  In a within-subjects 
comparison, the question is whether a tested item is more likely to be altered by misinformation 
than a nontested item.  Second, due to the influence of retrieval on subsequent memory of 
initially nonretrieved materials (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006), it 
is possible that RES may not occur in a within-subjects design.  Several studies have indeed 
shown that recalling part of an event can impair subsequent memory of the remainder of the 
event (e.g., Garcia-Bajos, Migueles, & Anderson, 2009; MacLeod, 2002; Shaw, Bjork, & 
Handal, 1995).  We expand on this phenomenon during the Introduction to Experiment 2. 
 All four experiments used the same general design.  First, participants watched an episode 
of the television program “24.”  They then completed one cued recall test, multiple recall tests, 
or an unrelated task.  If testing was manipulated within-subjects (as in Experiments 2 and 4), 
then all participants received the initial test(s), but the initial test(s) included only half of the final 
test items.  After a filled retention interval (i.e., 30 min or 1 week, depending on the experiment), 
participants listened to an audio narrative that contained the misleading information, which was 
followed by the final test. 
In every experiment, we varied the number of initial tests taken and the item type on a 
given test (i.e., consistent, control, misleading).  The item type variable was manipulated during 
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the postevent narrative.  For example, if the original video depicted a character driving an SUV, 
the narrative might report that the character drove an SUV (i.e., consistent), that the character 
drove (i.e., control, with no information on the type of vehicle), or that the character drove a 
pickup truck (i.e., misleading).  All questions were answerable, with the misinformation 
involving the substitution of a correct detail with an incorrect one.  Delay was varied across 
experiments.  Specifically, the delay between the initial and final tests was 30 min in 
Experiments 1 and 2, and 1 week in Experiments 3 and 4.  Lastly, the within- vs. between-
subjects design was also manipulated across experiments.  Experiments 1 and 3 manipulated the 
test vs. no-test variable between-subjects, whereas Experiments 2 and 4 manipulated the same 
variable within-subjects.  To compensate for the reduction of items when using a within-subjects 
design relative to a between-subjects design, Experiments 2 and 4 used 36 items whereas 
Experiments 1 and 3 used a set of randomly-selected 24 items (see Appendix A).  All 
participants in the current experiments were undergraduate students from Iowa State University 
who participated for research credits.  Moreover, all participants were permitted to participate in 
only one experiment.1   
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  There were 122 participants in Experiment 1.  Fourteen participants were 
excluded from analyses for reasons including lack of proficiency in English, failure to follow 
instructions, and an experimenter error.  Therefore, all analyses were based on data provided by 
the remaining 108 participants.  No participant had seen the video event within four months prior 
to participation.  
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Design.  Experiment 1 used a 3 (item type: consistent, control, misleading) X 3 (initial 
tests: 0, 1, 5) mixed design.  Item type was manipulated within-subjects and the number of tests 
was manipulated between-subjects.  Thirty-six participants occupied each between-subjects 
condition.  
Materials and Procedure.  Participants completed the study in groups of no more than 
eight on computer terminals separated by dividers.  The experiment started with the witnessed 
event video that showed a government agent working to stop the assassination of a presidential 
candidate.  Participants were given intentional encoding instructions.  The video lasted ~40 min.  
Following the video, participants in the 1-test and 5-test conditions completed one and five 
(identical) cued recall tests, respectively.  Participants were told that they might be asked the 
same question repeatedly.  They were told to be as accurate as possible and were explicitly given 
the option to respond with “I don’t know.”  No breaks were inserted between each initial test, 
which contained 24 questions (see the Appendix).  Participants had 15 s to type in a response to 
each question.  After the immediate test, participants in all conditions watched a 22 min video as 
a distractor activity, which depicted the British intelligence agency’s attempt to stop an anti-
abortion activist from killing abortion doctors and their families.  
 Following the distractor video, participants listened to a ~7 min audio narrative.  They 
were told that the narrative recapped the video event.  Embedded in the narrative were the 24 
critical details that had been tested during the immediate test, eight of these were consistent, 
eight were control, and eight were misleading.  Item type assignment was counterbalanced across 
participants.  After listening to the audio narrative, participants played the videogame Tetris for 5 
min as a distractor task.  They then completed the final cued-recall test, which contained the 
same 24 questions as the initial test.  The instructions of the final test emphasized that 
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participants should answer the questions based on their memory of the video event and did not 
mention the audio narrative.  Participants were given 15 s to respond to each question. 
Our procedure favored performance for participants in the no initial test condition 
because the delay between the video and the final test was the shortest in this condition (~34 
min), next was the 1-test condition (~40 min), and the delay was the longest in the 5-test 
condition (~66 min).  Therefore, if anything, this design should weaken the beneficial influence 
of repeated testing on final test performance.  
Results and Discussion 
Responses were classified into four categories: Correct, Misinformation, No Answer or 
Other Intrusions.  The Correct and Misinformation categories are self-explanatory.  “I don’t 
know” or unanswered questions were scored as No Answer, and the Other Intrusions category 
referred to reports that matched neither the original nor misleading detail.  The alpha level was 
set at .05.  Partial eta squared (ηp2) indicates effect size for analysis of variance (ANOVA), and 
Cohen’s d indicates effect size for t-tests.  We first report results from the initial test, particularly 
those regarding hypermnesia; we then report results from the final test.   
Initial Test.  Across the 1-test and 5-test conditions, .52 of the initial test responses were 
correct, .04 spontaneously matched the misinformation given later, .11 were classified as No 
Answer, and the remaining .34 were classified as Other Intrusions.  See Table 1 for correct recall 
probabilities as a function of initial test trial.  Overall, initial test accuracy did not differ between 
the 1-test and 5-test conditions, t < 1 (M = .51 and M = .53, respectively).  However, participants 
in the 5-test condition demonstrated significant hypermnesia.  That is, their recall probability 
rose over the five initial test trials, F(4, 140) = 10.68, p < .01, ηp2 = .23.    
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Final Test.  Separate analyses were conducted for misinformation recall and accurate 
recall probabilities (see Table 2 for means).  Most importantly, misinformation recall 
probability increased with the number of initial tests taken, F(2, 105) = 10.04, p < .01, ηp2 = .16.  
Planned comparisons showed that both participants in the 1-test (M = .48) and 5-test (M = .55) 
conditions recalled more misinformation than those in the no-test condition (M = .29), both ts > 
3.35, ps < .01, ds > .79.  However, the misinformation recall probabilities did not differ 
significantly between the 1-test and the 5-test conditions, t < 1, possibly due to low statistical 
power (observed power = .14).  
A 3 (initial tests: 0, 1, 5) X 3 (postevent information: consistent, control, misleading) 
ANOVA was conducted for correct recall probability.  The main effect for postevent 
information and the interaction were significant, Fs > 6.73, p < .01, ηp2 > .11, but the main effect 
for number of initial tests was not, F < 1.  Planned comparisons show that correct recall 
probability increased with testing for consistent items, F(2, 105) = 4.93, p = .01, ηp2 = .09, but 
not for control items, F(2, 105) = 1.10, p = .34, though the latter’s correct recall probabilities did 
rise numerically (from .47 to .53) with the number of initial tests taken. Importantly, for both the 
consistent and control items, the highest accurate recall probability was obtained by participants 
in the 5-test condition, showing that repeated retrieval can enhance eyewitness memory for 
neutral materials.  Remarkably, this testing effect was reversed when one encountered 
misinformation, F(2, 105) = 2.40, p = .10, ηp2 = .04.   
To further explore the influence of testing on eyewitness suggestibility, we computed 
false recall probabilities based on output-bound measures.  In the laboratory, researchers are 
aware of the information presented to participants and can produce input-bound measures, which 
are based on, for example, the number of correct responses out of the total number of items 
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presented during encoding.  However, in actual criminal cases, output-bound measures (that is, 
measures that are based on the total responses volunteered at output, removing omissions) might 
be equally important (Fisher, 1996; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996a; but see Bjork & Wickens, 1996, 
for caution against using such conditional measurements of accuracy).  We therefore examined 
the effects of initial testing on output-bound misinformation susceptibility.  Similar to the input-
bound measures, the output-bound misinformation recall probability increased with number of 
initial tests taken, F(2, 105) = 7.97, p < .01, ηp2 = .13, going from .32 with no initial test to .50 
with one initial test and .57 with five initial tests. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we examined the influence of repeated testing on eyewitness 
suggestibility in a within-subjects design.  To that end, all participants completed an initial test 
phase, but the initial test(s) included only half of the items that were to appear in the postevent 
narrative and the final test, and misinformation susceptibility was compared between the 
nontested and the tested items (i.e., the RES comparison).  Number of initial tests was 
manipulated between-subjects, such that some participants received only one initial test, some 
received three initial tests, and others received six initial tests. 
 Examining RES in a within-subjects design is important from an applied perspective.  In 
actual criminal cases, most witnesses must repeatedly recall details of a witnessed event prior to 
providing testimony in court, and it is likely that questioning will become more comprehensive 
as the investigation progresses.  That is, a witness may need to answer new questions later in the 
investigation that he/she had not been asked earlier.  It is therefore important to examine whether 
the RES effect would generalize to a within-subjects situations.  Instead of asking whether 
witnesses who had previously recalled an event would be more suggestible than witnesses who 
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had not performed any previous tests (as in Experiment 1), Experiment 2 addresses whether an 
eyewitness would be more susceptible to misinformation for a previously tested item than a 
nontested item.  From the perspective of psychology and the law, this is a very different, yet 
equally important, question. 
Aside from its applied implications, it is also interesting to examine RES in a within-
subjects design for theoretical reasons.  Specifically, we expect the RES effect to be smaller in 
magnitude in a within-subjects design.  We arrive at this prediction based on two related findings 
in the literature – retrieval-induced forgetting  (for a recent review, see Anderson & Levy, 2009) 
and retrieval-induced facilitation (Chan et al., 2006).  Retrieval-induced forgetting refers to the 
finding that recalling a subset of studied information can impair subsequent retrieval of the 
nontested but related information.  Retrieval-induced facilitation refers to the opposite finding; 
that is, recalling some studied information can enhance later recall of the nontested information.  
The apparent contradiction between these findings has been addressed in detail elsewhere (Chan, 
2009).  For current purposes, what is important is that both of these findings would lead one to 
predict that RES would diminish in a within-subjects (relative to between-subjects) design.  If 
retrieval-induced forgetting were to occur in the current context, then the initial test would 
weaken subsequent memory of the nontested items, thus increasing the likelihood that these 
items would be altered by misinformation later (Saunders & MacLeod, 2002, but see also Odinot 
et al., 2009).  Conversely, if repeated testing causes covert retrieval of the nontested items (i.e., 
retrieval-induced facilitation, cf. Garcia-Bajos et al., 2009), then these nontested items would 
become more similar to the tested items, thus reducing the difference in suggestibility between 
the tested and nontested items.  
Method 
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Participants.  There were 114 participants in Experiment 2.  Four participants were 
excluded from analyses because English was not their primary language.  Among the remaining 
110 participants, 36 were in the 1-test condition, 38 were in the 3-test condition, and 36 were in 
the 6-test condition.  
Design.  The experiment used a 2 (testing condition: tested vs. nontested) X 3 (tests: one, 
three, six) X 3 (item type: consistent, control, misleading) mixed design.  Testing condition and 
item type were manipulated within-subjects; number of tests was manipulated between-subjects.  
Materials and Procedure.  The materials and procedure were identical to those in 
Experiment 1 with the following exception: Because the testing condition (i.e., tested vs. 
nontested) was manipulated within-subjects, all participants received the immediate test.  There 
were 18 questions on the immediate test and 36 questions on the final test.  Whether an item was 
included on the initial test was counterbalanced across participants.  Participants took the 
immediate test either once, three times, or six times.  The narrative included 36 critical details, of 
which 12 were consistent, 12 were control, and 12 were misleading.  These critical details 
included those used in Experiment 1 as well as 12 additional details.  None of our conclusions 
changed regardless of whether we analyzed the data based on all 36 questions or only the 24 
questions that appeared in all four experiments. 
Results and Discussion 
Initial Test.  Overall, .58 of participants’ responses were correct, .05 matched the 
misinformation, .30 were Other Intrusions, and the remaining .08 were No Answer.  Similar to 
Experiment 1, repeated recall led to hypermnesia in both the 3-test and 6-test conditions (see 
Table 1 for means), Fs > 2.42, ps < .05, ηp2s > .07.   
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Final Test.  A 2 (testing condition: tested, nontested) X 3 (number of initial tests: 1, 3, 6) 
ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of initial testing on misinformation recall 
probability (see Table 3).  The main effect of testing condition indicates that a significant RES 
effect was found.  That is, participants were more likely to report misinformation for a tested 
item (M = .48) than for a nontested item (M = .35), F(1,108) = 27.45, p < .01, ηp2 = .20.  
Moreover, the interaction shows that the magnitude of RES increased with repeated initial tests, 
F(2, 108) = 6.34, p = .01, ηp2 = .11, such that the RES effect increased from a nonsignificant .05 
with a single initial test, t(35) = 1.25, p = .22, d = .18, to .09 with three initial tests, t(37) = 2.06, 
p = .05, d = .35, and .26 with six initial tests, t(35) = 5.38, p < .01, d = .91.  Similar to 
Experiment 1, the output-bound misinformation probabilities provide conclusions consistent with 
those from the input-bound measures. The output-bound RES effect rose from .04 with one 
initial test to .07 with three initial tests to .24 with six initial tests, interaction F(2, 108) = 5.56, p 
= .01, ηp2 = .09.  These findings illustrate the harmful effects of repeated testing on eyewitness 
suggestibility.   
To examine the effects of repeated testing on accurate recall, we conducted separate 
ANOVAs for each type of postevent information (i.e., consistent, control, misleading).  A 2 
(testing condition: tested, nontested) X 3 (number of initial tests) ANOVA showed that testing 
enhanced accurate recall of both the consistent items, F(1, 108) = 29.57, p < .01, ηp2 = .20, and 
the control items, F(1, 108) = 3.31, p = .07, ηp2 = .03.  However, increasing the number of initial 
tests did not alter the magnitude of these testing effects, F < 1.  The misleading items, however, 
did not show a testing benefit, F(1, 108) = 1.16, p = .21.  In fact, a reversed testing effect became 
evident as the number of initial tests increased, interaction F(2, 108) = 3.30, p = .04, ηp2 = .06. 
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Experiments 1 and 2 show that repeated testing can increase eyewitness suggestibility to 
subsequent misinformation.  However, perhaps due to the short delay between the initial and 
final tests, we failed to find a robust testing benefit for the control items.  Would repeated testing 
continue to increase eyewitness suggestibility if its memory enhancing effects can be revealed on 
the control items?  Recently, Chan and Langley (2011) reported that testing can increase 
eyewitness suggestibility even after a one-week delay, where significant testing benefits were 
observed for the control items, but they did not examine the influence of repeated initial tests on 
subsequent eyewitness suggestibility.  Given that the benefits of repeated testing (over taking a 
single initial test) is particularly pronounced after a long retention interval (Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2007), and that actual eyewitnesses often provide testimony after a lengthy delay, we 
examined the long-term effects of repeated testing on eyewitness suggestibility in Experiments 3 
and 4.  To that end, a one-week interval was inserted between the initial test and the final test.  
To facilitate comparison across experiments, Experiment 3 was modeled after Experiment 1 
(manipulating testing between-subjects) and Experiment 4 was modeled after Experiment 2 
(manipulating testing within-subjects). 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants.  There were 156 participants in Experiment 3.  Data from 55 participants 
were excluded from analyses, because 32 failed to attend the second testing session, and 23 were 
excluded based on reasons similar to those in Experiment 1.  Therefore, all analyses were based 
on the remaining 101 participants; with 34 in the no-test condition, 34 in the 1-test condition, and 
33 in the 5-test condition.  Attrition between the experimental sessions did not produce a subject 
REPEATED TESTING AND EYEWITNESS MEMORY   
 
19 
selection artifact, because the initial test accuracy did not differ between the dropout and non-
dropout participants, t(81) = 1.63, p = .11. 
Materials and Procedure.  The materials and procedure of Experiment 3 were identical 
to those of Experiment 1 except that the retention interval was changed to one week.  This delay 
replaced the distractor video.  That is, subjects watched the critical event video, completed the 
initial test, and were then dismissed for one week.  Upon their return, they listened to the audio 
narrative, played Tetris, and then completed the final test. 
Results and Discussion 
Initial Test.  Across the 1-test and 5-test conditions, .53 of the initial test responses were 
correct, .03 matched the misinformation, .13 were No Answers, and .30 were classified as Others 
Intrusions.  There was no difference between the 1-test and 5-test conditions in overall initial test 
accuracy (M = .51 and M = .55, respectively), t(65) = 1.29, p = .20, but a significant hypermnesia 
effect was found for participants in the 5-test condition (see Table 1 for means), F(4, 128) = 
9.54, p < .01, ηp2 = .23.   
Final Test.  Consistent with the results from Experiments 1 and 2, misinformation recall 
probability rose with the number of initial tests taken, F(2, 98) = 4.28, p = .02, ηp2 = .08 (see 
Table 4).  That is, taking a single initial test increased (though not significantly) misinformation 
recall probability from .44 to .51, t(66) = 1.50, p = .14, d = .36, and taking five initial tests 
further increased misinformation recall probability to .59, t(65) = 2.98, p < .01, d = .73 
(compared to no initial testing).  
To examine the effects of initial testing on accurate recall, separate one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted for each item type with number of initial tests as the independent variable.  As 
expected, a powerful testing effect was found for the consistent items and the control items, Fs > 
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14.08, ps < .01, ηp2s > .22.  In fact, the control items showed a clear advantage of taking multiple 
initial tests on final recall (M = .55) relative to a single initial test (M = .46), t(65) = 2.28, p = .03, 
d = .56.  Remarkably, despite the significant RES effect on misinformation recall, the misleading 
items showed a testing effect on accurate recall, F(2, 98) = 7.54, p < .01, ηp2 = .13, and this 
testing effect was found for both the 1-test and 5-test participants, both ts > 3.61, ps < .01, d > 
.88.  Two possibilities are consistent with this finding.  The first is that initial testing enhanced 
both retention of the witnessed event (leading to an increase in accurate recall) and the learning 
of the misinformation.  The second possibility is that initial testing relaxed participants’ response 
criterion on the final test.  Although our results are consistent with both possibilities, it seems 
unlikely that initial testing would lead to a criterion shift for two reasons.  First, to our 
knowledge, no existing data would prompt a criterion shift prediction a priori.  Second, we found 
no such pattern in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 2 and Table 3). 
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, the output-bound misinformation recall probabilities here 
were not affected by initial testing (.54 for no-test, .55 for 1-test, and .60 for 5-test), F < 1.  Why 
did the output-bound data produce a different pattern than the input-bound data?  From a 
quantitative perspective, the only difference between input- and output-bound measures is that 
the former include omission (which is the No-Answer) responses in the denominator and the 
latter do not.  Note that No-Answer responses accounted for a very small proportion of the total 
responses in Experiment 1 (M = .05) and Experiment 2 (M = .04), so the input- and output-bound 
data should resemble each other.  However, a one-week retention interval was used in 
Experiment 3, thus allowing significant forgetting to occur.  Because we did not use a forced 
report procedure, participants were therefore free to omit any responses that they deem unlikely 
to be correct, and participants who did not take an initial test omitted .16 of the questions.  
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However, because testing slowed forgetting, participants in the 1-test and 5-test conditions 
omitted only .06 and .01 of the questions, respectively.   
Because output-bound measures disregard the No-Answer responses from the 
denominator, response probabilities in conditions that contain a large proportion of No-Answer 
responses would rise accordingly.  For example, the raw misinformation recall probability in the 
no-test condition was .44, when one divide this probability by the total output minus No-
Answers (.84), the output-bound misinformation recall probability rose to .52.  However, 
because participants in the 1-test and 5-test conditions rarely used the No-Answer option, the 
probability of misinformation recall had virtually no room to move up.  Therefore, output bound 
measures, under some conditions, can mask the effects of variables that typically influence 
forgetting (e.g., Fisher, 1996, reported that output bound accuracy showed little forgetting over 
long periods of delay).  We return to a more thorough discussion of this idea in the General 
Discussion. 
In sum, Experiment 3 revealed that repeated testing can increase both accurate recall and 
misinformation susceptibility following a one-week retention interval.  In contrast to Experiment 
1, it is clear that the delay has allowed the advantage of testing to emerge for the consistent and 
control items.  Perhaps more surprisingly, the misleading items also demonstrated a testing 
benefit on its accurate recall probability, even though repeated testing also increased its 
misinformation recall probability.  In Experiment 4, we examined the effects of repeated testing 
on delayed eyewitness suggestibility in a within-subjects design.  Given that the RES effect is 
smaller in a within-subjects design (see Experiment 2) and the testing benefit is particularly 
powerful after a delay, it is possible that they would combine to eliminate RES altogether (cf., 
Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011).  In addition, we included a modified-modified free recall (MMFR, 
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Barnes & Underwood, 1959) test following the regular "final test" in this experiment.  The 
MMFR test was designed to reveal the accessibility of the original event memories and the 
misinformation, while minimizing the influence of response competition and metamemorial 
control processes that lead to response withholding (Higham, 2002; Roebers & Fernandez, 
2002). 
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants.  One-hundred-sixty-one students participated in this experiment.  Data from 
48 participants were excluded because 38 failed to attend the second testing session and 10 for 
reasons similar to those in Experiment 1.  All analyses were based on the remaining 113 
participants; with 38 in the 1-test condition, 35 in the 3-test condition, and 40 in the 6-test 
condition.  No subject selection problem was found when we compared the initial test accuracy 
between participants who attended the second session and those who did not, t < 1. 
 Materials and Procedure.  The materials and procedure of Experiment 4 were identical to 
those of Experiment 2 except that the retention interval following the initial tests was changed to 
one week, and an MMFR test was administered.  The MMFR test contained the same questions 
as the final test, but participants were given 25 s to respond to each question and were instructed 
to recall details from both the video and the audio narrative even if the details contradicted each 
other.  Participants were not asked to specify the source of their recalled details, and their 
responses were scored in the same way as in the regular test.  Note that because the MMFR test 
was designed to elicit multiple responses for the misleading questions, the combined 
probabilities of Correct, Misinformation, Other, and No Answer could, and often did, exceed 1. 
Results and Discussion 
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Initial Test.  Overall, .58 of the responses were correct, .04 matched the misinformation, 
.31 were Other Intrusions and .08 were No Answer.  No difference was detected in accurate 
recall probability across the 1-test, 3-test, and 6-test conditions (M = .59, M = .55, M = .58, 
respectively), F < 1.  In addition, the hypermnesia effect was significant in the 6-test condition 
(see Table 1 for means), F(5, 195) = 7.25, p < .01, ηp2 = .16, but not in the 3-test condition, F(2, 
68) = 2.26, p = .11, ηp2 = .06.  
Final Test.  Recall probability of misinformation rose with the number of initial tests 
taken, F(2, 110) = 2.60, p =.08, ηp2 = .05 (see Table 5).  However, unlike the prior three 
experiments, no RES effect was found, F < 1.  Moreover, there was no interaction between 
testing condition and number of initial tests, F(2, 110) = 1.21, p = .30.  That is, although repeated 
testing increased misinformation recall probabilities, this increase was comparable between the 
nontested and tested items, such that no significant RES effect was observed across all testing 
conditions, all ts < 1.44, p > .15.  Likewise, output-bound measures also revealed no significant 
RES effect, all ts < 1.13, p > .27. 
We now examine the effects of repeated testing on accurate recall.  For consistent items, 
there was a significant testing effect, F(1, 111) = 49.43, p < .01, ηp2 = .31, which increased with 
the number of initial tests taken, F(2, 110) = 4.53, p = .01, ηp2 = .08.  Specifically, the testing 
effect increased from .08 with a single initial test, t(37) = 1.78, p = .08, d = .31, to .25 and .19 
with three and six initial tests, respectively, ts > 4.03, ps < .01, ds > .80.  For the control items, 
there was a substantial (.26) testing benefit, F(2, 110) = 108.26, p < .01, ηp2 = .50, but this testing 
effect did not vary with number of initial tests, F(2, 110) = 2.06, p = .13, ηp2 = .04, p = .13.  For 
the misleading items, similar to Experiment 3, a powerful (.18) testing effect is observed, F(1, 
110) = 55.13, p < .01, ηp2 = .33.  This finding suggests that repeated testing, combined with a 
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long delay, can reduce eyewitness suggestibility in a within-subjects context.  We now present 
data from the MMFR test. 
MMFR Test.  Separate 2 (testing condition: tested, nontested) X 3 (number of initial 
tests: 1, 3, 6) ANOVAs examined the effects of testing on accurate recall of each item type in 
the MMFR test (see Supplementary Materials for the full data set).  Similar to results from the 
regular cued recall test, a testing benefit was found for all item types, all Fs > 32.30, ps < .01, ηp2 
> .22.  No other effects were significant. 
A 2 (testing condition) X 3 (number of initial tests) ANOVA was conducted to examine 
whether repeated testing enhanced misinformation learning, despite there being no RES effect in 
the regular cued recall test.  Unlike the data from the cued recall test, initial testing increased 
misinformation recall probability in the MMFR test, F(1, 110) = 6.28, p = .01, ηp2 = .05.  
Specifically, participants were more likely to report the misinformation for the tested items (M  = 
.61) than the nontested items (M  = .54).  Planned comparisons revealed a marginally significant 
RES effect for both the 3-test (a .09 difference) and the 6-test (a .10 difference) conditions, t(34) 
= 1.79, p = .08, d = .37, and t(39) = 1.96, p = .06, d = .35 , respectively.  The RES effect for the 
1-test condition was not significant but was also in the predicted direction (a .04 difference), t < 
1.   
Why did an RES effect occur in the MMFR test but not in the cued recall test?  In the 
cued recall test, participants were able to exert control over the reporting of information (Koriat 
& Goldsmith, 1996b; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000).  When participants encountered a 
question with multiple possible answers (e.g., the correct item and the misinformation), they 
must choose one to report, and this decision process should depend on the relative strength of the 
two items in memory (Thomas et al., 2010).  The results of the MMFR test indicate that testing 
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had a powerful strengthening effect on the memory of the original item.  Collapsed across all 
testing conditions, the accurate recall probability of the misleading items was .30 for the 
nontested items and .54 for the tested items.  Although testing did enhance learning of the 
misinformation (.54 for nontested vs. .61 for tested), this increase was small relative to the 
benefit for the original item.  We believe that this differential strengthening of the original and 
misleading items contributed to the elimination of the RES effect in cued recall.   
General Discussion 
 Four major findings emerged in the present study.  First, taking multiple initial tests can 
increase eyewitness suggestibility.  Second, the RES effect can happen on an item level (i.e., in a 
within-subjects situation) as well as on a participant level (between-subjects).  Third, the size of 
the RES effect is smaller on an item level than on a participant level.  Fourth, the item-level (but 
not the participant-level) RES effect can be eliminated when a long delay separates the initial 
and final test.  We now discuss the theoretical and applied implications of these findings. 
Repeated Testing Strengthens Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility 
In all four experiments, there was one clear, replicable pattern – taking repeated initial 
tests increased eyewitness suggestibility to later misinformation.  Across these four experiments, 
the average effect size of RES (as measured in Cohen’s d) with a single initial test was .30, but it 
was .76 with five or six initial tests.  Even armed with the knowledge of RES, this finding is 
surprising.  How can misinformation alter memory reports more effectively after multiple recall 
attempts than after one, or even no, recall attempt?  The data from the MMFR test in Experiment 
4 can shed light on this question.  Similar to the explanation offered previously (Chan & 
Langley, 2011; Thomas et al., 2010), the RES effect might occur because initial testing 
inadvertently drew attention to a subset of the items in the witnessed event.  When new 
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information regarding these items is presented, it captures participants’ attention.  Following 
multiple tests (as opposed to one test), the tested details become even more memorable, and 
misinformation regarding these details further captures participants’ attention when it is 
presented.  This situation somewhat resembles that of hypercorrection, where high-confidence 
errors are more readily corrected by feedback than low-confidence errors (Butterfield & 
Metcalfe, 2001; Kulhavy, Yekovich, & Dyer, 1976).  In a typical hypercorrection experiment, 
participants answer general knowledge questions that are likely to elicit errors (e.g., What is the 
capital of Australia?  Answer: Canberra), provide confidence for their answers, and then receive 
the correct answer as feedback.  Surprisingly, errors made with high confidence are more often 
corrected than those made with low confidence.   
Applying this logic to the present context, it is possible that some participants have 
assumed that all information presented in the postevent narrative was accurate, thus treating the 
narrative as a form of feedback.  If this is the case, then manipulations that increase the 
confidence of the original event details should increase their susceptibility to later 
misinformation, and repeated testing is one such manipulation.  Indeed, testing has been 
demonstrated to increase the confidence associated with a retrieved memory (Shaw, 1996; 
Thomas et al., 2010), and repeated testing can further inflate the confidence associated with these 
memories (Shaw & McClure, 1996).  When new information regarding these memories is 
presented, participants might experience a feeling of surprise (for similar arguments, see Fazio & 
Marsh, 2009); if participants fail to question the accuracy of this new information, then they 
might “hypercorrect” their original responses.  Consistent with this notion, the RES effect is 
eliminated when participants are told explicitly that information presented in the postevent 
narrative might be incorrect (Thomas et al.). 
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Can Initial Testing Help, Rather Than Hurt, Eyewitness Memory Accuracy? 
Perhaps the most encouraging finding in the current study is that taking a single initial 
test (rather than multiple initial tests) can, under some circumstances (see Experiment 4), reduce 
eyewitness suggestibility.  To consider the implications of this finding, we begin by examining 
the impact of repeated testing on performance during the initial test phase.  Strikingly, across all 
four experiments, the greatest hypermnesia occurred during the second initial test (see Table 1).  
Indeed, performance tended to peak at the second test trial, and further testing did not confer 
additional benefits.  Moreover, taking a single initial test already produced considerable benefits 
for delayed recall.  Across the four experiments, the effect size (in Cohen’s d) of taking one 
initial test on final accurate recall was .60, .83, and .35 for the consistent, control, and misleading 
items, respectively.  With five or six initial tests, these effect sizes became .81, .99, and .20.  
Therefore, taking five or six initial tests led to a modest benefit on delayed accurate recall 
compared with taking only one test for the consistent and control items, but this advantage was 
more than offset by a substantial increase in participants’ suggestibility (from .30 to .76, as 
mentioned previously). 
Although providing a warning can minimize RES (Thomas et al., 2010), one concern 
with such an approach is that warnings might be more effective in the laboratory than in the 
field.  Specifically, in laboratory settings, targeted warnings can be delivered because the 
experimenter is aware of the source of the misinformation (e.g., the experimenter might inform 
the participant that the postevent narrative might contain misinformation).  However, in actual 
criminal investigations, it is unclear whether or from where a witness might have encountered 
misinformation.  Consequently, warnings are likely less specific in the field than in experiments 
(for a similar argument on warning in the context of post-identification feedback, see Lampinen, 
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Scott, Pratt, Leding, & Arnal, 2007), and the specificity of a warning can have a large impact on 
its effectiveness.  For example, general warnings that simply question the credibility of the 
postevent narrative (e.g., Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982) often produce weaker effects than 
specific warnings that directly inform participants not to report information from the narrative 
(e.g., Lindsay, 1990; Wright, 1993).  Therefore, “realistic” warnings might not be as effective as 
those in Thomas et al.  It is thus imperative to explore alternative methods that can reduce the 
impact of RES.   
In the current experiments, we found that testing, in combination with a long delay, can 
eliminate RES on the item (or within-subjects) level but not on the participant (or between-
subjects) level (see Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011, for a recent demonstration of a similar result).  
Before we discuss the implications of this finding, it is important to first examine the two factors 
that contribute to this effect.  The first is that the memorial benefit of testing increases with 
delay.  The second is that the item-based RES effect appears to be weaker than the participant-
based RES effect.  The former finding is well known, as many researchers have found that 
testing can slow forgetting, particularly after longer retention intervals (for recent discussions, 
see Carpenter et al., 2008; Chan, 2010).  However, given that a long delay itself does not 
eliminate RES (as evidenced by the data from Experiment 3 here and also from Chan and 
Langley, 2011), we must now consider the within- and between-subjects design difference as the 
crucial contributor to the weaker RES effect in Experiments 2 and 4.  As we have mentioned 
during the Introduction to Experiment 2, two findings suggest that a within-subjects design can 
reduce the magnitude of RES relative to a between-subjects design.  First, the retrieval-induced 
forgetting argument suggests that initial testing might trigger inhibition of the nontested items, 
thereby weakening these items and causing them to be more susceptible to misinformation later 
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(MacLeod, 2002).  Alternatively, the retrieval-induced facilitation idea suggests that during the 
initial test, participants might covertly retrieve target-related memories.  For example, when 
participants attempt to answer a question about the main character’s shirt color, they might 
spontaneously recall the shirt color of his wife, with whom he was conversing.  This covert 
retrieval renders the tested and nontested items more similar, thus weakening the item-based (or 
within-subjects) RES effect.   
Although both retrieval-induced forgetting and facilitation can weaken the item-based 
RES effect, according to the existing literature, one might expect retrieval-induced facilitation to 
be the more likely contributor here.  Specifically, we used coherent video materials (instead of 
word lists) in both experiments and a week-long delay to separate the initial and final tests in 
Experiment 4.  These factors can reduce the likelihood of retrieval-induced forgetting (Chan, 
2009; Odinot et al., 2009).  One way to examine whether retrieval-induced forgetting had 
occurred in our experiments is to compare the accurate recall probabilities of the nontested 
control items in the within-subjects experiments (e.g., see the third mean in the top three rows of 
Table 5) with the control items for the nontested participants in the between-subjects 
experiments (e.g., see the second mean in the first row of Table 4).  If retrieval inhibition had 
occurred, then the former accurate recall probability would be lower than the latter.  Because 
Experiments 2 and 4 had 36 items whereas Experiments 1 and 3 had only 24 items, we examined 
the recall probabilities of only the 24 items that appeared in all four experiments to ensure a fair 
comparison.  When considering only these 24 items, results from the first initial test showed that 
there was no difference in participants’ performance across the four experiments (M = .51, .51, 
.50, .50 for Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively) – that is, any difference observed in the final 
test cannot be attributed to subject differences across experiments.  Based on the final test data, it 
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is clear that retrieval-induced forgetting did not occur in our within-subjects experiments, 
because accurate recall probability of the nontested, control items in Experiment 2 (.49) was not 
lower than that in Experiment 1 (.47, see first row of Table 1).  In fact, the same comparison 
showed a numerical advantage for Experiment 4 (.25) over Experiment 3 (.19, see first row of 
Table 3), suggesting that retrieval-induced facilitation might have occurred. 
Note that the current experiments were not designed to address the underlying 
mechanisms that contribute to the difference between the item-based and participant-based RES 
effect.  Rather, these experiments were devised to examine whether RES can occur on an item 
(or within-subjects) level, and the answer is yes.  For present purposes, the important finding is 
that taking a single initial test can enhance eyewitness memory without increasing suggestibility 
in a within-subjects context, and this advantage is particularly prominent after a substantial 
retention interval.  
Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility or Retrieval-Enhanced Errors? 
Although our data generally showed that repeated retrieval can enhance eyewitness 
suggestibility to misinformation, one issue must be addressed prior to our conclusion section.  
Specifically, to fully understand the impact of repeated testing on eyewitness memory, one must 
account for two types of commission (instead of omission) errors – systematic errors produced 
by exposure to misinformation and nonsystematic errors produced idiosyncratically by the 
witness (i.e., the “Other Intrusions” as defined here).  From a legal perspective, mistaken witness 
reports are undesirable, regardless of their origin; therefore, it is important to examine whether 
repeated testing can increase the total errors (i.e., misinformation recall plus other intrusions) 
produced by eyewitnesses.  To simplify comparisons, we compared the total error rate between 
the no-test and 5/6-test condition across the four experiments.  The data are presented in Figure 
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1.  A clear pattern emerged.  Repeated testing increased the total errors in recall in Experiments 1 
and 2, but it had no influence on total error rates in Experiments 3 and 4.  How can one reconcile 
this discrepancy?  The main difference between the first two experiments and the last two 
experiments was the delay implemented, with the former being 30 min and the latter being one 
week.  It is possible that repeated testing failed to increase the total error rate in the latter 
experiments because participants were more prone to producing idiosyncratic intrusions when 
they have forgotten a substantial portion of witnessed event, and some of these intrusions were 
replaced by misinformation for participants in the repeated testing condition.  Hence, initial 
testing did not alter the overall commission error rate in these experiments.  Critically, however, 
this finding does not change our claim that repeated testing increased eyewitness suggestibility to 
misinformation.   
There is an important distinction between misinformation-based errors and other 
intrusions, as only the former is systematic and manipulable, and thus much more dangerous in 
legal settings.  For example, a police officer may knowingly introduce misinformation to a 
suspect in hopes of obtaining a conviction, as reported in some recovered memory cases (Loftus, 
1993).  Moreover, misinformation errors and other intrusions are likely characterized by different 
metamemorial experience.  Although we did not acquire confidence data in the current 
experiments, unpublished data collected under similar conditions in our laboratory indicate that 
misinformation-based errors are accompanied by higher confidence than other intrusions (d = 
.68, N = 82), which might be crucially important in courtroom situations.  In sum, although 
repeated testing does not always increase the total errors produced by an eyewitness, it does 
appear that repeated testing can increase eyewitness suggestibility to misleading information. 
Concluding Remarks 
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The finding that repeated recall can exacerbate the misinformation effect has important 
implications for eyewitness memory.  Because repeated questioning is likely necessary in most 
police interviews (Krahenbuhl, 2007), it is crucial to develop techniques that can reduce its 
negative impact.  Recently, Thomas et al. (2010) reported that people can overcome the 
debilitating effects of RES when armed with a warning.  This is certainly an encouraging 
finding, though it is unclear whether providing a warning would eliminate RES after repeated 
recall.  Moreover, as mentioned previously, it might not be possible for criminal investigators to 
provide the type of precise warnings typically employed in the laboratory.  Therefore, it is 
crucial for future research to investigate methods that can reduce the influence of RES, 
especially following repeated retrieval attempts. 
Although we made an effort to ensure that our methods are somewhat analogous to real-
life eyewitness situations (e.g, by using a relatively life-like video event, by testing eyewitness 
memory over separate sessions), several methodological decisions may limit the generalizability 
of our results.  For example, we used the same video event across all four experiments, we 
administered the identical recall test in a single experimental session, and the longest retention 
interval we used was one week.  In actual cases, the repeated questions are sometimes 
administered by different individuals at various intervals and are likely to include different 
questions.  Moreover, the delay involved in actual criminal cases can be far longer than one 
week.  The timing of repeated testing can have a profound effect on memory.  In particular, 
distributed practice has been shown to enhance long-term retention more than massed practice 
(for a review, see Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2006).  Given that increasing the 
delay between the repeated tests also necessitates an increase in the overall retention interval, it 
is possible that repeated, distributed tests can reduce the impact of RES.  Admittedly, it is 
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impossible for any study to investigate all possible schedules of repeated testing (among other 
variables), so further research is required to expand on the scope of the present findings.  Note, 
though, for situations where the repeated questions happen in a single interview session, our 
procedure might have maximized their benefits on memory, because our repeated questions 
occurred on the computer (a clearly automated system) and participants were told in advance that 
they might be asked the same questions multiple times.  These procedures likely diminished the 
detrimental effects of repeated questioning relative to how it is conducted in field investigations, 
where eyewitnesses might feel the social pressure to alter an answer when they were asked the 
same question again and again by a police officer.  Consequently, it is all the more impressive 
that we found such a powerful RES effect in the current experiments. 
In sum, several new findings emerged in the present study.  We found that repeated 
testing can increase accurate recall when the questions are asked in an open-ended, neutral 
manner.  However, when one is given misleading information later, the initial repeated tests can 
increase, rather than reduce, eyewitness suggestibility.  Importantly, the magnitude of this RES 
effect depends on a number of factors, including whether the testing manipulation occurs within- 
or between-subjects, the number of initial test taken, and the retention interval.  These findings 
helped to further elucidate the condition under which repeated retrieval would improve, or 
impair, eyewitness memory. 
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Footnotes 
1  Although sex and age data were not collected for participants in the present experiments, we 
believe that these participants would not differ dramatically from others who we have 
participated in experiments conducted in our laboratory over the past academic year.  Among the 
814 subjects tested, the male/female split was 51/49 with a mean age of 19.48 (SD = 2.14, and 
range = 17-39).   
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Table 1 
Mean Probabilities of Correct Recall in the Initial Test Phase, With Standard Deviations Shown 
in Parentheses 
 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 
Experiment 1       
1-test .51 (.13)      
5-test .50 (.16) .53 (.13) .54 (.12) .54 (.13) .54 (.13)  
Experiment 2       
1-test .61 (.11)      
3-test .58 (.15) .61 (.14) .61 (.13)    
6-test .54 (.16) .57 (.17) .56 (.17) .55 (.17) .56 (.18) .57 (.16) 
Experiment 3       
1-test .51 (.10)      
5-test .49 (.16) .53 (.13) .53 (.13) .53 (.13) .54 (.14)  
Experiment 4       
1-test .59 (.15)      
3-test .54 (.14) .56 (.13) .56 (.14)    
6-test .56 (.12) .58 (.12) .59 (.12) .59 (.12) .59 (.13) .59 (.13) 
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Table 2 
Mean Probabilities of Recall on The Final Test as a Function of Item Type and Response Type in 
Experiment 1 (Between-Subjects, Short Delay), With Standard Deviations Shown in Parentheses 
 
Recall of Original, Correct Item 
 
Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .74 (.19) .47 (.22) .39 (.20) 
1-test .79 (.19) .51 (.20) .28 (.23) 
5-test .86 (.16) .53 (.17) .30 (.25) 
Recall of Misinformation 
 
Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .01 (.04) .05 (.09) .29 (.16) 
1-test .01 (.03) .06 (.09) .48 (.30) 
5-test .00 (.02) .05 (.09) .55 (.29) 
Other Intrusions 
 Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .20 (.18) .39 (.19) .27 (.13) 
1-test .17 (.15) .36 (.18) .20 (.16) 
5-test .12 (.14) .37 (.16) .14 (.11) 
No Answer 
 Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .05 (.09) .10 (.10) .06 (.12) 
1-test .04 (.09) .07 (.10) .05 (.09) 
5-test .02 (.05) .06 (.09) .02 (.06) 
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Table 3 
Mean Probabilities of Recall on The Final Test as a Function of Item Type and Response Type in 
Experiment 2 (Within-Subjects, Short Delay), With Standard Deviations Shown in Parentheses  
Recall of Original, Correct Item 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
1-test .71 (.16) .83 (.14)  .56 (.23) .60 (.18)  .38 (.25) .44 (.28) 
3-test .77 (.16) .84 (.16)  .55 (.19) .59 (.22)  .38 (.23) .32 (.24) 
6-test .68 (.19) .81 (.17)  .54 (.21) .59 (.22)  .40 (.27) .31 (.28) 
Recall of Misinformation 
 
Consistent 
 
Control 
 
Misleading 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
1-test .03 (.07) .02 (.06)  .01 (.04) .04 (.07)  .35 (.24) .40 (.29) 
3-test .01 (.05) .01 (.05)  .03 (.09) .04 (.08)  .39 (.26) .48 (.29) 
6-test .04 (.08) .01 (.05)  .06 (.10) .05 (.08)  .29 (.21) .55 (.34) 
Other Intrusions 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested 
1-test .19 (.15) .12 (.11)  .34 (.19) .29 (.18)  .22 (.16) .12 (.12) 
3-test .18 (.15) .14 (.14)  .36 (.20) .33 (.20)  .19 (.16) .19 (.15) 
6-test .21 (.18) .15 (.11)  .33 (.18) .31 (.19)  .25 (.18) .12 (.15) 
No Answer 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested 
1-test .06 (.09) .02 (.06)  .09 (.15) .07 (.12)  .06 (.14) .03 (.07) 
3-test .03 (.08) .01 (.04)  .07 (.11) .04 (.11)  .05 (.09) .01 (.04) 
6-test .07 (.11) .03 (.12)  .07 (.13) .06 (.13)  .07 (.12) .03 (.09) 
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Table 4 
 
Mean Probabilities of Recall on The Final Test as a Function of Item Type and Response Type in 
Experiment 3 (Between-Subjects, Long Delay), With Standard Deviations Shown in Parentheses  
   
Recall of Original, Correct Item 
 Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .63 (.21) .19 (.13) .09 (.09) 
1-test .80 (.11) .46 (.17) .24 (.21) 
5-test .83 (.17) .55 (.18) .25 (.24) 
Recall of Misinformation 
 Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .03 (.06) .05 (.08) .44 (.16) 
1-test .00 (.02) .04 (.07) .51 (.22) 
5-test .01 (.04) .05 (.07) .59 (.24) 
Other Intrusions 
 Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .24 (.13) .53 (.21) .31 (.19) 
1-test .15 (.11) .40 (.19) .20 (.13) 
5-test .14 (.15) .34 (.16) .16 (.13) 
No Answer 
 Consistent Control Misleading 
No-test .11 (.11) .24 (.19) .16 (.14) 
1-test .05 (.08) .11 (.11) .06 (.09) 
5-test .02 (.05) .06 (.08) .01 (.04) 
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Table 5 
Mean Probabilities of Recall on The Final Test as a Function of Item Type and Response Type in 
Experiment 4 (Within-Subjects, Long Delay), With Standard Deviations Shown in Parentheses 
Recall of Original, Correct Item 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
1-test .64 (.21) .72 (.27)  .32 (.23) .56 (.18)  .25 (.23) .44 (.28) 
3-test .58 (.22) .83 (.16)  .25 (.21) .58 (.23)  .20 (.18) .38 (.29) 
6-test .62 (.26) .81 (.21)  .30 (.16) .51 (.23)  .17 (.17) .32 (.27) 
Recall of Misinformation 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
1-test .04 (.08) .04 (.09)  .08 (.18) .07 (.13)  .41 (.27) .37 (.26) 
3-test .05 (.09) .01 (.06)  .11 (.13) .05 (.09)  .44 (.27) .43 (.27) 
6-test .05 (.08) .03 (.07)  .08 (.11) .05 (.10)  .46 (.19) .53 (.31) 
Other Intrusions 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested 
1-test .26 (.20) .20 (.22)  .46 (.22) .32 (.18)  .25 (.20) .16 (.19) 
3-test .28 (.19) .15(.14)  .45 (.20) .28 (.20)  .25 (.17) .18 (.17) 
6-test .25 (.20) .13 (.19)  .47 (.23) .35 (.21)  .29 (.20) .14 (.15) 
No Answer 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested 
1-test .06 (.10) .04 (.11)  .14 (.20) .05 (.10)  .10 (.15) .04 (.07) 
3-test .10 (.15) .01 (.04)  .19 (.20) .09 (.12)  .12 (.13) .02 (.05) 
6-test .08 (.12) .03 (.07)  .15 (.18) .08 (.13)  .09 (.11) .02 (.06) 
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Figure 1.  Mean probabilities of total commission errors (i.e., Misinformation + Other 
Intrusions) during the final recall test of the four experiments as a function of number of initial 
tests.  The no-test error rates for the within-subjects experiments (Exp 2 and 4) were based on the 
averaged recall probabilities of the nontested items in the 1-test, 3-test, and 6-test conditions. 
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Appendix 
 
The 36 Questions, Along With Their Correct Answer and Misinformation, Used in the 
Present Experiments.  Items With an Asterisk Were Used in All Four Experiments; Items 
Without an Asterisk Were Used in Only Experiments 1 and 3. 
1. What is David Palmer's shirt color? [Correct Answer: Blue, Misinformation: Grey]  
2. What is Sheri Palmer working on at the beginning of the episode? * [Correct Answer: Thank 
you notes, Misinformation: Campaign staff appointments] 
3. How many floors does Jack Bauer's house have? [Correct Answer: One, Misinformation: 
Two] 
4. What are Jack and Kim doing at the beginning of the episode? [Correct Answer: Playing 
chess, Misinformation: Playing Backgammon] 
5. At the beginning of the episode, what color is Jack Bauer's shirt? * [Correct Answer: Blue, 
Misinformation: White] 
6. When you first see her, what is Teri Bauer's shirt color?* [Correct Answer: Green, 
Misinformation: Blue] 
7. What item does Jack take out of the refrigerator?* [Correct Answer: Jello Cup, 
Misinformation: Soda] 
8. What band poster is on Kim's bathroom door?* [Correct Answer: Coldplay, Misinformation: 
Radiohead] 
9. How long does Jack expect to be gone when he is called from home? * [Correct Answer: 1 
hour, Misinformation: 2 hours] 
10. Jack speaks to Kim's ex-boyfriend on the phone.  What is his name? * [Correct Answer: 
Vincent, Misinformation: Xander] 
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11. What type of vehicle does Jack drive? * [Correct Answer: SUV, Misinformation: Pick-up 
truck] 
12. Janet and Kim are meeting two guys.  What year are they in school? [Correct Answer: 
Sophomores, Misinformation: Freshmen] 
13. What item is on the dashboard of Janet's car? * [Correct Answer: Hawaiian Lei, 
Misinformation: Fuzzy dice] 
14. What color is Nina's shirt? * [Correct Answer: Black, Misinformation: Green] 
15. What is the color of Dan & Rick's van? * [Correct Answer: Purple, Misinformation: Black] 
16. How many corrupt agents did Jack investigate at CTU? [Correct Answer: Three, 
Misinformation: Five] 
17. What time is Martin's meeting with Palmer? * [Correct Answer: 7:00 AM, Misinformation: 
9:00 AM] 
18. What is the name of the woman sitting next to Martin? [Correct Answer: Mandy, 
Misinformation: Marcy] 
19. What college does Rick attend? * [Correct Answer: San Diego State, Misinformation: USC] 
20. How long does Kim say it has been since her father died? * [Correct Answer: 6 months, 
Misinformation: 3 months] 
21. Midway through the episode, Jack changes his shirt.  What is the new shirt color? [Correct 
Answer: Grey, Misinformation: Black] 
22. What does Mason call when Jack asks for additional approval? * [Correct Answer: Time and 
Date service, Misinformation: Operator] 
23. What does Jack take to cover the tranq gun? [Correct Answer: Binder, Misinformation: 
Briefcase] 
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24. Jack talks to Mason about a drug dealer.  What type of drug was being trafficked? * [Correct 
Answer: Heroin, Misinformation: Cocaine] 
25. How much money was missing from the drug deal? [Correct Answer: $200,000, 
Misinformation: $300,000] 
26. What is Kim's password for her email? [Correct Answer: LIFESUCKS, Misinformation: 
SCREWLIFE] 
27. What city has Martin recently photographed? * [Correct Answer: Munich, Misinformation: 
Frankfurt] 
28. What part of the city does Teri tell Jack that Kim has gone? * [Correct Answer: Valley, 
Misinformation: Downtown] 
29. How many messages does Kim have on her cell phone? [Correct Answer: Five, 
Misinformation: Four] 
30. Where is George Mason's illicit bank account? * [Correct Answer: Aruba, Misinformation: 
Costa Rica] 
31. What does the terrorist use on the flight attendant? * [Correct Answer: Hypodermic syringe, 
Misinformation: Chloroform rag] 
32. What is the explosive with the timer hidden in? * [Correct Answer: Fire extinguisher, 
Misinformation: Drink cart] 
33. What color is the car Teri is in at the end of the episode? [Correct Answer: Silver, 
Misinformation: Blue] 
34. What type of plane does Tony report has exploded? * [Correct Answer: 747, Misinformation: 
DC-10] 
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35. Which desert does Tony report that the plane exploded over? * [Correct Answer: Mojave 
Desert, Misinformation: Baja Desert] 
36. What street does Kim say she lives on when she is in Dan's van? * [Correct Answer: 10th 
Street, Misinformation: 25th Street] 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Table A. 
Mean Probabilities of Recall on The Modified-Modified Free Recall (MMFR) Test as a Function 
of Item Type and Response Type in Experiment 4 (Within-Subjects, Long Delay), With Standard 
Deviations Shown in Parentheses 
Recall of Original, Correct Item 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
 
Nontested Tested 
1-test .71 (.21) .82 (.18)  .33 (.21) .65 (.18)  .31 (.23) .60 (.22) 
3-test .69 (.22) .83 (.20)  .37 (.25) .60 (.23)  .29 (.24) .51 (.29) 
6-test .65 (.27) .82 (.23)  .37 (.19) .57 (.23)  .29 (.33) .51 (.26) 
Recall of Misinformation 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested 
1-test .11 (.14) .07 (.11)  .12 (.17) .10 (.12)  .59 (.22) .63 (.24) 
3-test .08 (.12) .05 (.11)  .15 (.17) .06 (.11)  .53 (.26) .62 (.23) 
6-test .11 (.19) .09 (.17)  .13 (.14) .07 (.10)  .50 (.25) .60 (.28) 
Other Intrusions 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested 
1-test .38 (.23) .29 (.18)  .61 (.19) .43 (.20)  .36 (.23) .28 (.22) 
3-test .38 (.21) .26 (.23)  .59 (.28) .41 (.24)  .37 (.25) .29 (.21) 
6-test .37 (.25) .22 (.20)  .59 (.22) .45 (.31)  .40 (.24) .24 (.19) 
No Answer 
 Consistent  Control  Misleading 
 Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested  Nontested Tested 
1-test .02 (.06) .03 (.07)  .10 (.18) .00 (.00)  .06 (.11) .02 (.05) 
3-test .04 (.09) .06 (.29)  .12 (.30) .08 (.32)  .09 (.29) .01 (.03) 
6-test .02 (.05) .02 (.06)  .07 (.13) .05 (.11)  .03 (.08) .03 (.11) 
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